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The Natural, the Pragmatic and the Moral in Kant’s Anthropology: 
The Case of Temperaments1 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore the interconnections between the normative and 
the descriptive dimensions of Kant’s anthropology. I will suggest that far from being 
independent of each other or even excluding each other, as is often presupposed, the 
normative standpoint necessitates the explanatory one. For while Kant’s anthropology 
is expressedly and legitimately normative in its intent, I will argue that achieving this 
purpose requires it to have a descriptive and explanatory dimension. To support this 
claim, I will discuss the case of human temperaments and show in what sense a 
necessary component of pragmatic anthropology consists in the naturalistic study of 
human nature – what Kant calls ‘what nature makes of the human being’.2 I will 
briefly conclude by reflecting on whether this is a useful way of thinking about Kant’s 
anthropological project as a whole.  
 
 
1. The Realm of the Pragmatic 
I want to begin by emphasising that the claims of Kant’s pragmatic anthropology are 
literally practical – they comprise advice, recommendations, counsels, guidance, 
warnings and even admonitions. In this regard, it should be noted that Kant’s lectures 
on anthropology, on which his published Anthropology is based, were intended to 
teach students how to apply what they learnt at university to their future profession as 
well as to the conduct of their life in general. Their popularity led students to produce 
transcripts that were traded and handed down from year to year, and they eventually 
formed the basis of the published Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View in 
1798.3  In other words, these lectures, which arose from the Lectures on Physical 
Geography, were meant to show students how to use their knowledge and talents as 
‘citizens of the world’. 
The physical geography [course] which I am announcing hereby belongs to an 
idea which I make myself of a useful academic instruction and which I may 
call the preliminary exercise in the knowledge of the world. This knowledge 
of the world serves to procure the pragmatic element for all otherwise 
acquired sciences and skills, by means of which they become useful not 
merely for the school but rather for life and through which the accomplished 
apprentice is introduced to the stage of his destiny, namely, the world. (Kant, 
On the Different Races of Human Beings, 97 [2:443])4 
                                                        
1  As the following works by Kant are cited frequently, I have used the following abbreviations: 
Anthropology (Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View), Observations (Observations on the 
Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime,), and Groundwork (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals). The reference is to the Akademie edition of Kant’s works, using the translations from the 
Cambridge Edition of Kant’s Works (Cambridge University Press). I would like to thank Tamas 
Demeter for his support whilst writing this paper, and two referees of this journal for their critical 
comments.  
2 Kant, Anthropology, 231 7:119.  
3 Vol. XXV of the Academy edition of Kant's gesammelte Schriften (Göttingen, 1997) as well as its 
English translation (Cambridge University Press, 2013) contain extremely useful introductions 
detailing the nature of the transcripts and their historical background (Brandt and Stark, ‘Einleitung’, 
vii-cli, and Wood ‘Introduction’, 1-10). Due to restrictions of space, I refer to them for a presentation 
of Kant’s Lectures themselves.  
4 Kant’s Lectures on Physical Geography, part of which developed into his Lectures on Anthropology, 
were popular lectures attended by and partly intended for the general public (see Kant, Anthropology, 
 2 
To accomplish this task, Kant focuses on knowledge ‘of practical relevance’, that is to 
say knowledge that is useful to one’s conduct in life. 5  This knowledge has an 
extremely broad scope: it discloses ‘the sources of all the [practical] sciences, the 
science of morality, of skill, of human intercourse, of the way to educate and govern 
human beings, and thus of everything that pertains to the practical’.6 
Kant begins his Anthropology with an explicit reference to its aims: pragmatic 
knowledge of the human being is ‘the investigation of what he as a free-acting being 
makes of himself, or can and should make of himself’.7 The ‘make’ points to the 
descriptive part of Kant’s project – what men actually make, or have made, of 
themselves. The ‘can make’ refers to the realm of possibility, i.e., the scope and limits 
of the human being’s influence on himself, whilst the ‘should make’ indicates the 
prescriptive part of Kant’s project, which encompasses the whole realm of human 
action – i.e., its technical, prudential and moral dimensions.8  
Of course, as is regularly noted by commentators, Kant sometimes calls the 
prudential dimension of human action ‘pragmatic’. For instance, he writes,  
The first imperative could also be called technical (belonging to art), the 
second pragmatic (belonging to welfare), the third moral (belonging to free 
conduct as such, that is, to morals). (Kant, Groundwork, 69 [4:416–17])9 
However, far from entailing an inconsistency, it merely implies that, as 
already hinted at, the word ‘pragmatic’ can be understood in two distinct senses: in a 
narrow sense as ‘prudential’ and having to do with welfare and happiness, and in a 
broad sense as ‘practical’ and having to do with the field of action in general. My 
claim is that Kant’s use of the term ‘pragmatic’ to describe his Anthropology refers to 
the latter rather than the former, for its recommendations encompass all of the 
dimensions of human actions: the development of skills, the means of achieving 
happiness, and the helps and hindrances to morality. In other words, the prescriptive 
dimension of anthropology is based on the knowledge of what is necessary to achieve 
one’s purposes, whether they are technical, prudential or moral. 
                                                                                                                                                              
233∗ [7:122]). For a presentation of Kant’s lectures on anthropology and their reception, see Wilson, 
Kant’s Pragmatic, 7–26, and Brandt and Stark, ‘Einleitung’, vii–cli. On the genesis of Kant’s lectures 
on anthropology, see Zammito, Kant, Herder, 293–302 and Wilson ‘A Gap’. 
5 Kant, Anthropology, 233 [7:122]. 
6 Kant, Correspondence, 141 [10:145]. The notion of ‘knowledge’ is of course problematic here since 
Kant does not mean to suggest that the knowledge at stake in anthropology is of the same kind as the 
knowledge in natural science. However, it goes well beyond the remit of this paper to tackle this issue. 
Suffices to say that for Kant, anthropological knowledge is based on empirical generalisation, 
induction and interpretation. For discussions of this question, see Cohen, Kant, Sturm, Kant and 
Wilson, Kant’s Pragmatic.  
7 Kant, Anthropology, 231 7:119. 
8 As is regularly noted by commentators, Kant sometimes calls the prudential dimension of human 
action ‘pragmatic’. For instance, he writes, ‘The first imperative could also be called technical 
(belonging to art), the second pragmatic (belonging to welfare), the third moral (belonging to free 
conduct as such, that is, to morals).’ (Kant, Groundwork, 69 [4:416–17]) However, far from entailing 
an inconsistency, it merely implies that, as already hinted at, the word ‘pragmatic’ can be understood in 
two distinct senses: in a narrow sense as ‘prudential’ and having to do with welfare and happiness, and 
in a broad sense as ‘practical’ and having to do with the field of action in general. My claim is that 
Kant’s use of the term ‘pragmatic’ to describe his Anthropology refers to the latter rather than the 
former, for its recommendations encompass all of the dimensions of human actions: the development 
of skills, the means of achieving happiness, and the helps and hindrances to morality (Kant, 
Anthropology, 294 [7:186], 342 [7:239], 264–5 [7:153]). In other words, the prescriptive dimension of 
anthropology is based on the knowledge of what is necessary to achieve one’s purposes, whether they 
are technical, prudential or moral. 
9 See also Metaphysics of Morals, 565–6 [6:444–6].  
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However, if the notions of technical and prudential roles of anthropology do 
not seem to pose any difficulty, the idea of a moral role of anthropology does, and it 
does so for numerous reasons that have recently been the object of much debate 
amongst Kant scholars. 10  Can we reconcile Kant’s various, and apparently 
inconsistent, uses of the concept of moral anthropology? 
As is often noted, the concept of a ‘moral’ or a ‘practical’ anthropology occurs 
in Kant’s works in an apparently inconsistent fashion. In the Groundwork, moral 
anthropology is described as the empirical part of ethics, and Kant makes clear that it 
should be totally separated from pure ethics: it is ‘of the utmost necessity to work out 
for once a pure moral philosophy, completely cleansed of everything that may be only 
empirical and that belongs to anthropology’.11 Yet in the Metaphysics of Morals, 
anthropology seems to be incorporated into the project of pure ethics: ‘a metaphysics 
of morals cannot dispense with principles of application, and we shall often have to 
take as our object the particular nature of human beings, which is cognised only by 
experience, in order to show in it what can be inferred from universal moral 
principles’.12 Can these two claims be reconciled? 
I want to argue that this apparent inconsistency disappears if we focus 
specifically on the difference between the various projects at stake, and in particular 
on the notion of an ‘application’ of ethics to human nature. Claudia Schmidt makes an 
important contribution in this respect. She distinguishes between two senses of the 
word ‘application’: ‘One is the a priori or constitutive application of the pure 
principles of morality to the human being, as an empirical given type of moral agent, 
in order to generate an a priori system of the types of duties which are binding for this 
type of agent. The other is what we may call the empirical or motivational application 
of the doctrine arising from this system of morality to any individual human will, in 
order to improve the moral conduct of that individual.’13 With this distinction in hand, 
we can proceed to the division of the different tasks assigned to the various strands of 
Kant’s ethical project: first, the project that produces an a priori system of duties for 
rational agents in general (Groundwork, Critique of Practical Reason); second, the 
project that generates an a priori system of the duties that are binding upon a 
particular type of agent, namely human agents (Metaphysics of Morals); and third, the 
project that examines the worldly helps and hindrances to human moral agency 
(Anthropology and Lectures on Anthropology). 
On this basis, and to summarise my interpretation of the nature of Kant’s 
pragmatic anthropology, it may be helpful to position it within the ongoing debate 
between Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark. Brandt argues that pragmatic 
anthropology is ‘not the discipline of practical anthropology, variously described by 
Kant, that was supposed to function as a complement to pure moral philosophy’.14 By 
contrast, Stark holds that ‘an internal, positive relationship exists between Kant’s 
                                                        
10 See, for instance, Frierson, Freedom, Louden ‘Applying’ and Schmidt ‘Kant’s Transcendental’. 
11 Kant, Groundwork, 44 [4:389]. 
12 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, 372 [6:217]. 
13  Schmidt ‘Anthropological Dimension’, 72–3. On this basis, I believe that talking about moral 
anthropology in terms of the ‘application’ of Kant’s ethics is very unhelpful. For instance, the title of 
Louden’s paper ‘Applying Kant’s Ethics: The Role of Anthropology’ is misleading, for it blurs the 
boundary between the pure principles of practical reason and their application on the one hand (which 
includes pure ethics and the metaphysics of morals), and the moral use of anthropology on the other 
hand. As Louden himself notes, moral anthropology has to do with making morality efficacious in 
human life (Louden, ‘Applying’, 355–7). Thus the idea of ‘applying ethics’ is, in this context, more 
appropriate to the project of the Metaphysics of Morals. 
14 Brandt, ‘The Guiding Idea’, 92. 
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lectures on anthropology and his moral philosophy; [...] Kant considered 
anthropology to be an integral part of his philosophy (including his critical 
philosophy), and that it is not to be reckoned as a mere appendage to the system. [. . .] 
The positive and critical content of the anthropology, in my opinion, cannot be 
reduced to a mere doctrine of prudence.’ 15  I agree with Brandt that pragmatic 
anthropology is not identical to moral anthropology insofar as the former also 
contains what could be called ‘prudential’ anthropology. However, I agree with Stark 
that pragmatic anthropology does contain a specifically moral anthropology. In this 
sense, moral anthropology as I defined it can be thought of as a sub-discipline of the 
broader field of pragmatic anthropology. 
As a result, within its pragmatic context, Kant’s anthropology essentially aims 
at accomplishing three tasks. First, it describes human beings’ behaviour relative to 
their purposes. Second, it deduces from their predispositions the scope of what they 
can make of themselves. Third, it draws conclusions regarding what they should do, 
pragmatically, in order to accomplish the best possible fulfilment of their purposes, 
whether technical, prudential or moral. 
 
2. The Physiological vs. the Natural 
Pragmatic anthropology is defined from the very beginning in opposition with the 
investigation of what nature makes of the human being: 
Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of 
what nature makes of the human being; pragmatic, the investigation of what 
he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself 
(Kant, Anthropology 231 7:119). 
This key passage from the Introduction of Kant’s Anthropology has often been 
interpreted as inaugurating a paradigm for anthropology that rejects the investigation 
of ‘what nature makes of the human being’ in favour of the investigation of ‘what the 
human being makes of himself’.16 Yet far from rejecting the inquiry into ‘what nature 
makes of man’ as a whole, I believe that Kant merely rejects one of its forms, namely 
the physiological inquiry into mind-body relations; however, he does not reject the 
inquiry into the natural characteristics of human beings.   
Kant defines his pragmatic anthropology negatively by contrasting it with 
physiological anthropology: 
He who ponders natural phenomena, for example, what the causes of the 
faculty of memory may rest on, can speculate back and forth (like Descartes) 
over the traces of impressions remaining in the brain, but in doing so he must 
admit that in this play of his representations he is a mere observer and must let 
nature runs its course, for he does not know the cranial nerves and fibers, nor 
does he understand how to put them to use for his purposes. Therefore all 
theoretical speculation about this [physiological knowledge of the human 
being] is a pure waste of time. (Kant, Anthropology, 231 [7:119]) 
As noted by numerous commentators, this passage should be read as a criticism of the 
work of Platner, and in particular of his definition of anthropology. 17  Platner 
                                                        
15 Stark, ‘Historical Notes’, 21. 
16 The first interpreter to do this is in fact Schleiermacher in his Review of Kant’s Anthropology, 16. I 
have discussed it in detail in Cohen, “A Response”. See also Frierson, Freedom, ch. 1.  
17 For an account of Platner’s views, see Zammito, Birth, 250–3 and for a lengthy study, Naschert & 
Stiening, Ernst Platner. Zammito notes that in the lecture course for 1772–73 [25:I:9], Kant criticised 
physiological approaches to anthropology targeting Charles Bonnet instead of Ernst Platner (Zammito, 
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conceives of anthropology as the synthesis of the physical science of physiology and 
anatomy on the one hand, and psychology on the other: it studies body and soul in 
their mutual relations, limitations and interactions. 18  Kant rejects physiological 
approaches to anthropology in a letter to Hertz: ‘the subtle and, to my view, eternally 
futile inquiries as to the manner in which bodily organs are connected with thought I 
omit entirely’.19 For Kant, physiological investigations of human nature should not 
belong to anthropology. A number of passages from the Anthropology reiterate and 
justify this claim. First, these investigations have not reached a sufficient level of 
scientific certainty to be reliable: ‘physicians and physiologists in general are still not 
advanced enough to see deeply into the mechanical element in the human being.’20 
But even if they could reach such a level, which Kant believes they could, second, 
insofar as the purpose of his anthropology is pragmatic, it cannot make any use of 
physiological knowledge in this context. Physiology can certainly be of some use to 
doctors but not to human beings who want to use anthropological knowledge to 
realise their purposes.21 Thus it is the intent of Kant’s anthropological project, namely 
its usefulness for the conduct of life, that delimits the relevance of its content.  
[T]he materials for an anthropology […] the method of their use in attempting 
a history of humanity in the whole of its vocation […] may be sought neither 
in metaphysics nor in the cabinet of natural history specimens by comparing 
the skeleton of the human being with that of other species of animals (Kant, 
Review of Herder’s Ideas 134 [8:56]) 
Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish between two conceptions of the enquiry into 
‘what nature makes of the human being’: one as the investigation of the mind–body 
relation, physiological anthropology, the other as the investigation of the natural 
characteristics of the human species. As I will show, Kant does in fact proceed to the 
enquiry into ‘what nature makes of the human being’ in the latter sense. So if one 
form of the enquiry, namely the investigation of mind–body relations, is vain, another 
form, that of the investigation of the natural characteristics of the human species, is 
legitimate when it is used to improve our pragmatic knowledge of human beings – a 
knowledge that is necessary for us to use nature, and in particular our nature, to 
realise our purposes. In other words, far from requiring us to choose between 
explanatory and normative standpoints, adopting adopting a normative point of view 
on the human being calls for an explanatory one – although it may seem at first glance 
paradoxical since they are often portrayed as opposed if not incompatible. From the 
standpoint of pragmatic anthropology, ‘what nature makes of the human being’ is 
indispensable to ‘what he should make of himself’ since human beings need to know 
their nature as well as nature in order to be able to determine what they are capable of. 
As a result, even from a pragmatic standpoint, human beings have to take into account 
parts of the naturalistic account of themselves, whether it is their temperament, gender, 
race, nationality and so on.22 Doing so amounts to seeing the human species as a 
natural species that is nonetheless free, and understanding its natural determinations 
                                                                                                                                                              
Birth, 469). For a historical description of the various ‘medical’ or ‘physiological’ studies of human 
beings contemporary with Kant, see Lestition, Anthropology and Sturm, Kant. 
18 See Platner, Anthropologie.  
19 Kant, Correspondence, 141 [10:145].  
20 Kant, Anthropology, 319 [7:214]. See also Kant, Anthropology, 385 [7:287].  
21 See Sturm who talks about Kant’s irrelevance thesis ‘concerning the empirical knowledge of the 
physiological basis of the mind’ (Sturm, ‘Why’, 495). He contrasts it with other contemporary critics 
who based their objections upon epistemological or methodological arguments, and develops it at 
length in Kant.  
22 Kant, Anthropology, 383 7:283.  
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as compatible with the possibility of its freedom. As summed up in the Friedländer 
Lectures on Anthropology, ‘Anthropology is thus a pragmatic knowledge of what 
results from our nature’.23 
The clearest instance of natural anthropology, the investigation of the natural 
characteristics of the human species, can be found in Kant’s ‘Anthropological 
characteristics’, where he argues that temperaments, sexes, races and nations are – at 
least partly – determined according to nature’s intentions for the human species. In 
the rest of the paper, I will focus on Kant’s account of human temperaments and use it 
as a case-study for my suggestion. As I will show, the knowledge of natural human 
characteristics is of crucial pragmatic use, for it helps human beings learn about the 
natural dimension of their behaviour, thereby enabling them to act more effectively. 
 
 
2. Kant’s account of human temperaments 
A number of human characteristics are defined as being determined, at least partly, 
according to nature’s intentions for the species: ‘Innate to human nature are germs 
which develop and can achieve the perfection for which they are determined.’ 24 
Amongst them are human temperaments, which are defined, at least partly, as 
products or effects of nature: ‘what nature makes of the human being […] belongs to 
temperament (where the subject is for the most part passive)’.25 More precisely, Kant 
distinguishes between natural aptitude, temperament and character: ‘natural aptitude 
has more (subjectively) to do with the feeling of pleasure or displeasure’ – it is a 
passive feeling –, whereas temperament has to do ‘(objectively) with the faculty of 
desire’ and is thus active. However, both natural aptitude and temperament belong to 
sensibility, whilst character belongs to the mode of thinking: ‘The first two 
predispositions indicate what can be made of the human being; the last (moral) 
predisposition indicates what he is prepared to make of himself.’26 Temperaments are 
thus effects of nature (i.e. they belong to the domain of ‘what Nature makes of the 
human being’) whilst character is a product of freedom (i.e. it belongs to the domain 
of what the human being makes of himself).  
In his Anthropology, Kant distinguishes between four temperaments: the choleric, 
the phlegmatic, the melancholic and the sanguine. 27  Whilst it is unnecessary to 
discuss the detail of these temperaments here, what is crucial for my present purpose 
is that each temperament has particular natural tendencies, and in particular 
tendencies that favour certain moods, emotions and inclinations. For instance, the 
sanguine, who ‘is carefree and of good cheer; he attributes a great importance to each 
thing for the moment, and the next moment may not give it another thought’; the 
melancholic, who ‘attributes a great importance to all things that concern himself’; the 
choleric, who ‘is hot-tempered, flares up quickly like straw-fire’; and finally, the 
                                                        
23 Kant, Lectures on Anthropology-Friedländer 48 25:471.  
24 Kant, Lectures on Anthropology-Friedländer 227 25:694. See also Kant, Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, 109-11 8:18-21. 
25 Kant, Anthropology, 390 [7:292].  
26 Kant, Anthropology, 384 [7:285–6]. As noted by a referee of this journal, Kant’s notion of character 
is complex. For, Kant recognises that ‘character’ is often used to designate habits of behaviour 
(including those that result from temperament), and distinguishes this from ‘Charakter schlechthin’ 
(7:292, and 8:285), which he identifies with ‘Denkungsart’. Whilst I acknowledge this complexity, I 
believe that it is irrelevant to my argument.  
27 For a detailed account of Kant’s concept of temperament, in particular relative to the historical 
tradition of the temperaments, see Larrimore ‘Substitutes’.  
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phlegmatic, who has ‘the propensity to inactivity’. 28  In other words, each 
temperament has its own emotional profile. 
While Kant’s account of temperaments describes them as part of the world of 
nature, it does not entail that they cannot have a pragmatic role to play, for as I will 
argue, anthropological knowledge of temperaments has important pragmatic uses for 
human beings. I will begin by spelling out its uses for cognition, before turning to its 
uses for morality.  
 
 
3. The pragmatic uses of human temperaments: Kant’s anthropology of cognition 
The aim of Kant’s anthropology of cognition to instruct human beings how to 
cultivate their cognitive capacities so as to make the best use of them – note how Kant 
repeatedly talks of ‘the use of understanding and reason’, ‘the use of reason’, ‘the use 
of the understanding’ or the ‘purposive use of the faculty of cognition’.29 On this 
basis, it develops along two complementary lines. On the one hand, it studies nature’s 
purposes for the human species – the natural dimension of human cognition. On the 
other hand, it uses this knowledge to help us realise of our cognitive vocation – the 
pragmatic dimension of human cognition. This pragmatic dimension consists in 
spelling out the natural subjective conditions that help or hinder our cognition, 
thereby enabling us to become more cognitively efficacious. As I will show, since 
each type of temperament comes with its own brand of cognitive strengths and 
weaknesses, the knowledge of our temperament is a crucial help to the progress of our 
cognition. It enables us not only to be conscious of the pitfalls we face, but also to 
know how to best use our strengths and improve upon our weaknesses.30 For instance, 
as Kant writes: 
The question thus is, what is better, to carry out one’s work in a short time, in 
order to have the remaining time entirely for leisure, or to carry out the same 
work very gradually over a long time, without having time left over for 
leisure? The difference is based on people’s temperaments. (Kant, Lectures on 
Anthropology-Friedländer 61-2 25:488) 
 
Table 1. Cognitive disparities between temperaments31 
Temperaments Strengths Weaknesses 
Sanguine Popular, witty, lively Trivial, thoughtless, disorderly 
Melancholic Profound, original, serious 
Obscure, dogmatic, obstinate, 
punctilious 
Choleric 
Methodical, precise, keen-
witted, orderly 
Incorrect, doesn’t bear 
contradiction, dogmatic 
Phlegmatic Sweeping, talented imitator 
Laborious, superficial, 
procrastinator, sluggish 
 
                                                        
28 Kant, Anthropology, 386–8 [7:288–90]. See also Kant, Observations, 33-6 2:220-24. 
29  Based on Kant, Anthropology 386-8 7:288-91, Lectures on Anthropology-Mrongovius 386 
25:1261, Lectures on Anthropology-Friedländer 106 25:545, Lectures on Anthropology-Busolt 520 
25:1481, Lectures on Logic-Jäsche 577 9:74, Critique of the Power of Judgment 175 5:295. For 
an overall account of Kant’s anthropology of cognition, see Cohen, “Anthropology”.  
30  See for instance Kant, Lectures on Anthropology-Friedländer 89 25:522, Lectures on 
Anthropology-Mrongovius 396 25:1275, and Anthropology 295 7:186.  
31 Kant, Anthropology, 386–8 [7:288–90], Lectures on Anthropology-Friedländer 185, 188-91 25:641, 
25:644-7 and Lectures on Anthropology-Mrongovius 366, 469-72 25:1237, 25:1373-6.  
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First, negatively, since depending on our temperament we have the tendency to 
make certain kinds of errors, have weak capacities or even lack certain powers, 
knowing our temperament can make our cognitive endeavours more reliable by 
pointing to potential pitfalls. The awareness of our cognitive weaknesses thus enables 
us to be more responsive to them and thereby less likely to fail or err. It reveals 
domains where our temperament is pointing in the direction of error (for instance, the 
melancholic is dogmatic), and conversely domains where our temperament is pointing 
away from error (for instance, the choleric is precise). On the basis of this knowledge, 
the melancholic should be mindful of the fact that he might be blind to other points of 
view, whilst the choleric can safely rely on the details of his calculations. Similarly, 
since the sanguine is witty and lively of spirit but lacks profundity, he should be 
attentive to the fact that his cognitive endeavours will require ‘more investigation and 
seriousness’.32  Or to take an example that Kant is particularly keen on, people’s 
capacity for memory will exhibit different strengths and weaknesses depending on 
their temperament.33  
Sanguine people have an adroit and vivid memory, phlegmatic people have a 
slow and lasting (tenax) memory. Choleric people have a memory that is faithful 
but does not grasp easily (non capax). Melancholics have a vast and faithful 
memory. (Kant, Lectures on Anthropology-Mrongovius 397 25:1276) 
Thus, the phlegmatic should not rely on memories that he acquired too quickly whilst 
the melancholic can. Taking account of it in their cognitive endeavours will make 
them more efficient, more reliable and generally more successful.  
Second, positively, being aware of our temperament is helpful to determine the 
course of action that is best for our cognition: which talent needs cultivating, which 
capacity needs improving, which endeavour we should engage in and which we 
should avoid. For instance, since the melancholic, whilst profound and serious, lacks 
a certain ‘liveliness of the spirit’, he should avoid disciplines that require it, such as 
scientific popularisation.34 By contrast, the sanguine is particularly well suited to it 
since he is lively and witty. Moreover, since certain temperaments have the tendency 
to weaken the use of particular capacities, specific cognitive measures can be taken to 
strengthen them. For instance, phlegmatics should work on their short-term memory 
by recording little and striving to remember many things, whilst cholerics should 
develop their speed by using the understanding to help remember topics and 
frameworks.35  
Needless to say, I could list many other examples from Kant’s Lectures on 
Anthropology. But I believe that what I have argued so far suffices to conclude that 
the anthropological knowledge of temperaments, and of the empirical features of 
human cognition more generally, is helpful to the successful realisation of our 
cognitive endeavours. Of course, it does not entail that we cannot possibly realise 
                                                        
32  Kant, Lectures on Anthropology-Friedländer 185, 188-91 25:641, 25:644-7 and Lectures on 
Anthropology-Mrongovius 366, 470-2 25:1237, 25:1373-6. 
33 Famously, it is the example he uses to illustrate the purpose of pragmatic anthropology in the 
Anthropology’s introduction: ‘if he uses perceptions concerning what has been found to hinder or 
stimulate memory in order to enlarge it or make it agile, and if he requires knowledge of the human 
being for this, then this would be a part of anthropology with a pragmatic purpose, and this is precisely 
what concerns us here’ (Kant, Anthropology 231 7:119). 
34  Kant, Lectures on Anthropology-Friedländer 186 25:641. ‘He who determines his horizon 
aesthetically seeks to arrange science according to the taste of the public, i.e., to make it popular, or in 
general to attain only such cognitions as may be universally communicated, and in which the class of 
the unlearned, too, find pleasure and interest’ (Kant, Lectures on Logic-Jäsche 550 24:40-1)  
35 Kant, Lectures on Anthropology-Mrongovius 396 25:1275.  
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them without it but rather that this knowledge enables us to be more efficient and 
reliable knowers.  
 
 
4. The pragmatic uses of human temperaments: Kant’s anthropology of morals 
Since temperaments are part of the world of nature, insofar as they give rise to 
sensible incentives, they cannot lead to genuine virtue, which, being based on 
character, stems from the will. However, Kant often seems to claim that although 
temperaments cannot lead to moral worth, they nevertheless play some kind of role 
vis-à-vis morality. Each temperament has its own emotional profile, and since some 
feelings are more helpful or harmful than others, we ought to attend to our emotional 
capacities if and when they impact our moral agency. As I will suggest, there are two 
essential ways in which they do so. First, knowing the emotional tendencies 
associated with our temperament makes the realization of our moral goals more 
effective by pointing to potential pitfalls. Second, with each temperament comes the 
tendency to weaken the use of certain capacities – or rather, to pose stronger obstacles 
to the use of certain capacities for moral purposes. Thus, temperaments have no part 
to play with the agent’s moral improvement as such, but rather indirectly with the 
improvement of his natural capacities. They do not help the making of the moral 
choice but rather, they help the realization of the choice, whatever it is, by identifying 
the subjective human features that may either further or hinder it.36  
 
Table 2. Emotional disparities between temperaments37 
Temperaments Strengths Weaknesses 
Choleric Sense of honor, 
shame 
Prone to passions 
Sanguine Generous, 
Sympathetic, 
good heart 
Sinner, fickle 
Melancholic Noble and 
righteous 
Selfish 
Phlegmatic Apathetic Unsympathetic 
 
To begin with, knowing our emotional tendencies makes the realization of our 
moral goals more effective by pointing to potential pitfalls. For instance, our 
emotional tendencies can point in the same direction as duty (for instance, the 
sanguine temperament and the duty of benevolence, since he is naturally generous), or 
conversely they can point away from duty (for instance, the melancholic temperament 
and the duty to keep promises, since he doesn’t naturally keep his word). It follows 
that in coinciding situations (when emotional tendencies and duty converge), I should 
discriminate between the moral and the non-moral motives so as to isolate the dutiful 
one. Conversely in conflicting situations (when emotional tendencies and duty 
diverge), I should exercise control over the non-moral motives so as to facilitate 
action from the moral one. For instance, the melancholic should be wary of making 
                                                        
36 Larrimore interestingly remarks that as Kant moves from an ethics based on feeling to an ethics 
based on rational autonomy, his theory of temperaments also changes. For instance, in Observations on 
the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, Kant celebrates the melancholic as the virtuous 
temperament par excellence, whilst in the Anthropology he commends the phlegmatic as the 
temperament that can serve as a substitute for wisdom (Larrimore, “Substitutes”, 259).  
37 Kant, Observations, 32-3 2:219-20 and Anthropology, 386-9 7:288-91.  
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promises unless he is certain he can keep them; or in situations when the duty of 
benevolence applies, the sanguine should question his seemingly benevolent motives 
whilst the choleric should temper his selfish motives.  
Second, since each temperament has its own emotional profile, with it comes the 
tendency to weaken the use of certain capacities – or rather, to pose stronger obstacles 
to the use of certain capacities for moral purposes. For instance, choleric 
temperaments are more prone to passions than others. And since passions hinder the 
ability to choose rationally, cholerics ought to refine, and if possible overcome, their 
passions in order to strengthen their capacity for self-control. Although taming one’s 
inclinations is not a virtue, it eases the realisation of duty by facilitating self-control. 
In a similar way, each temperament has particular weaknesses which it ought to 
address. Sanguine temperaments ought to attend to their capacity for self-mastery by 
refining their feelings. Phlegmatic temperaments on the other hand are not prone to 
feeling sympathy. They are naturally insensitive to human distress, and thus unable to 
detect situations where they ought to exercise their duty of benevolence.38 As a result, 
it is more important for them to attend to their capacity for sympathy by encouraging 
acquaintance with other people’s painful feelings. The melancholic, by ‘attributing a 
great importance to all things that concern himself’, is naturally selfish. Thus it will 
be important for him to attend to his capacity for disinterested love by cultivating his 
appreciation of natural beauty.  
 
Table 3. The moral role of anthropology 
Temperament Recommendation Capacity 
Sanguine To silence the voices that obstruct 
conscience 
Conscience 
Phlegmatic To sympathise with others’ fate  Sympathy 
Choleric To read books, to refine feelings  Self-mastery  
Melancholic To appreciate natural beauty Disinterested love 
 
Of course, the capacities for feelings thereby cultivated have no intrinsic moral 
worth. For one could just as well use them for immoral purposes. A melancholic who 
develops his sympathetic feelings, or a choleric who learns to control his emotions, is 
not a morally improved agent; his moral character is not better than if he had not 
cultivated these capacities; rather, first, he is a more efficient moral agent in the sense 
that he will be better armed to carry out his purposes. And second, one could say that 
this agent will be more confident (though never certain) that he is as committed as 
possible to the realisation of duty; or at least that he will be more warranted in feeling 
confident than agents who do not cultivate these capacities at all.39  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Whilst Kant’s anthropology is expressedly normative in its intent, I have shown in 
what sense achieving its purpose requires it to have an explanatory dimension. To 
support this claim, I have focused on the case of temperaments. I have done so 
because I believe that it provides a good illustration of how an agent can use 
descriptive knowledge about her nature to inform her decisions and help her realize 
                                                        
38 Kant, Anthropology, 386 [7:288].  
39 For a defense of the (different) claim that we have an indirect duty to cultivate our capacities for 
certain feelings on the basis of the anthropological knowledge of our temperament, see Cohen, Kant, 
89-104. 
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her purposes more efficiently. Of course, one may be tempted to object that Kant’s 
account of temperament is hardly the pinnacle of his achievements.40 I cannot but 
agree, although this is not the point. Whatever the detail of his account, it is the role it 
plays in his anthropology that I aimed to emphasize. Namely, the naturalistic 
knowledge of temperaments is an essential component of the pragmatic use of 
anthropology as applied to Kant’s typology of human temperaments. Some have been 
sceptical of the supposed usefulness of these typological descriptions. As Zammito 
has noted for instance, ‘it was not clear how much value these typologies might have 
provided his students for the world.’41 Yet once again, while the content of Kant’s 
typology of temperament can legitimately be questioned, as many have done for his 
account of gender or race, there is no doubt that the principle behind it is sound.42 To 
put it rather simplistically, if someone wants to improve his cognitive skills, he will 
do so more efficiently if he knows his cognitive weaknesses, and any explanatory 
discipline that offers a typology of them will be relevant to and in fact essential to his 
enterprise of cognitive self-improvement. The same goes for morality. As embodied 
rational agents, we ought to attend to our emotional capacities if and when they have 
an impact on our moral agency. Since they do so more often than not, a crucial part of 
anthropology is to provide the empirical knowledge (and in the case we are discussing, 
of our temperaments) that is necessary to identify the features that can help or hinder 
the performance of our duty.43 
Whilst this paper has focused mostly on the case of human temperaments, I 
believe that it applies to all dimensions and levels of human nature. First, pragmatic 
anthropology provides knowledge of how to improve human cognition. It also 
provides numerous recommendations for ways of improving the use of cognitive 
faculties: memory, sensory perception, understanding, judgement and reason, 
imagination, wisdom and so on.44 To be able to do so, natural anthropology needs to 
identify different types of cognitive derangements that afflict the faculties of human 
cognition, and suggests various ways of overcoming them. For instance, it examines 
the decreasing, weakening and entire loss of the faculty of the senses and the soul’s 
weaknesses and illnesses with respect to its cognitive faculty.45 Second, pragmatic 
anthropology provides knowledge of how to help the realisation of our agency in the 
world, including moral purposes. On the one hand, it identifies the hindrances to 
morality and suggests various ways of overcoming them: combating passions, 
controlling emotions, moderating affects and so on.46 On the other hand, it identifies 
the helps to morality: moral education, political institutions, politeness, social 
intercourse and so on.47 Third, pragmatic anthropology provides knowledge of how to 
                                                        
40 I would like to thank a referee for raising this point.  
41 Zammito, “What a Young Man”, 239-40.  
42 See for instance Eze, ‘Colour’ and Mikkola, ‘Kant’.  
43 One may further object that the descriptions and the explanations provided by anthropology are not 
proper knowledge. It goes well beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this issue, but briefly, I 
believe that this knowledge is based on empirical generalisations that rely on observation, statistics and 
interpretation, as discussed in Cohen, Kant, 52-60. 
44 Respectively in Kant, Anthropology, 291–5 [7:182–6], 261–3 [7:149–51], 273–8 [7:162–6], 304–9 
[7:197–202], 278–84 [7:167–74]; 332–3 [7:228–9]. For details on the improvement of the general 
cognitive faculty, see Schmidt, “Disorders”. See also Makkreel, “Imagination”, on the use and misuse 
of imagination. 
45 Kant, Anthropology, 275–84 [7:165–75] and 309–26 [7:202–21]. 
46 Anthropology, 366–76 [7:265–75], 355–66 [7:253–65] and Metaphysics of Morals 535–6 [6:407–8]. 
47 Respectively in Kant, Lectures on Pedagogy, 473–85 [9:486–99], Perpetual Peace 131fn [8:375], 
Idea, 111–12 [8:21] and Speculative Beginnings, 165–7 [8:111–13] for political institutions, and 
Anthropology, 39 [7:152–3] and Metaphysics of Morals 588 [6:473–4] for politeness and social 
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realise our prudential purposes, and in particular happiness. To be able to do so, 
natural anthropology needs to examines cases of boredom and amusement, sensuous 
pleasures, taste, the art of good living and so on.48 
Therefore, an essential part of pragmatic anthropology consists in identifying the 
worldly helps and hindrances to the realisation of human purposes in the world. And 
as I have argued, this can only be achieved through the investigation of what nature 
makes of the human being. In this sense, far from being independent of each other, or 
even excluding each other, as is often presupposed, the normative standpoint 
necessitates the explanatory one. 
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